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such alterations, with a special focus on the report of the President’s Council
“Beyond Therapy” and the proposal of a right to freedom of memory advanced
by Adam Kolber.
Introduction
Memory is a marvelous capacity. It allows representing the past and adapting future
behavior in light of prior experiences. In a more colorful way, it is described as “mental
time travel” (Tulving 1985) or “the presence of an absent thing stamped with the seal of
the anterior (Ricoeur 2004, p. 17).”Memory is a multifaceted phenomenon, not a single
entity but a bundle of functionally distinct yet interwoven capacities with different
neurophysiologic foundations that enable the most basic forms of learning such as
classic conditioning as well as reminiscing about the trajectory of one’s life.
Current memory models differentiate several systems by content (LeDoux 2007):
Declarative memory comprises semantic, autobiographic, and episodic contents that
can easily be verbalized, whereas non-declarative memory stores motor or perceptual
skills and conditioned stimulus–response patterns which can be behaviorally
expressed but hardly articulated. Thus the verb “to remember” does not denote
a single activity but comprises, e.g., the ability to express acquired procedural skills
and factual knowledge as well as reexperiencing the past with that distinct phenom-
enal quality for which Elving Tulving coined the term “autonoetic consciousness”
(Tulving 2002). In the following, we shall be primarily interested in the latter.
Further distinctions are drawn between temporal phases and processes. Mem-
ory content has to be acquired, stored, and recalled – accordingly, encoding,
consolidation, and retrieval constitute the three main phases of memory. Directly
upon encoding, memory traces are labile and prone to rapid decay. Most items in
working memory (e.g., after perception) are never processed further; only some
are transferred into long-term memory. During this process of consolidation,
neural memory traces – also called “engrams” – are organized and stabilized.
How memories are exactly stored remains a mystery and seems to differ for
various types; the search for the engram is still on (Thompson 2005; H€ubener and
Bonhoeffer 2010). By all we know, memories are not stored in easily localizable
brain structures but rely on networks of multiple brain areas and changes in the
synaptic strength between neurons. The terms storage and consolidation suggest
that contents of memory become permanently fixed traces in the brain, insensi-
tive to modification, stored away until retrieval. However, such a static picture
misses the dynamic and changeable nature of memories: During the retrieval
process, sometimes induced through conscious effort, sometimes involuntarily,
the engram seems to return into a temporarily fragile state and undergoes another
process of consolidation (called reconsolidation) afterwards (Dudai 2012).
Reconsolidation in humans is still subject to controversy and investigation and
may have far-ranging implications (Schiller and Phelps 2011; Nader and
Einarsson 2010). During the short period of reconsolidation, suspected to last
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for a couple of hours, memories become open for alterations and seem to be
“updated” in light of present knowledge. Reconsolidation might imply that the
best recollection we have of a past event is our latest recollection of it (and not
the original perception which may have been “overwritten” by the altered mem-
ory). As a consequence, our memories are alterable without our awareness.
Memory is not, as the ancient metaphor of a wax tablet or modern variants of
a computer storage device suggest, a replication or a copy of the initially encoded
stimuli but a repeatedly reconstructive process and thereby susceptible to alter-
ations and contaminations. A remarkable fact, because from our subjective
experience, we are (too) confident that memory is more of a replay of recorded
information than an active, potentially error-prone process.
Whoever speaks about remembering should not forget forgetting, an equally
interesting and important process. Already its definition presents problems. As not
every transient inability to recall (such as tip-of-the-tongue inhibitions) amounts to
forgetting, how do we know, as Nietzsche pondered, whether we ever forget?
Smells, sounds, or sights can trigger quite powerful memories which were
irretrievable in the absence of such cues. Strictly speaking it can never be ruled
out that some regularly inaccessible memory traces, excitable under the right
conditions, still remain (Cf. Roediger III et al. 2010). Like remembering, forgetting
is a multifaceted phenomenon for which no unified theory exists. It can have
various causes: faulty initial consolidation, retroactive interference, trace decay
over time, or simple retrieval inhibitions (Wixted 2004; Schacter 2002).
In any case, forgetting should not be conceived of as cognitive defect only. It is
instrumentally useful for thinking – and possibly even remembering – because it
prevents informational overload by filtering pieces worth remembering. Without
forgetting we may suffer the fate of Funes the Memorious, a fictional character by
Luis Borges, who cannot forget and is completely observed in details (Borges et al.
2007). Patients resembling Fuentes and suffering from their hyperthymestic mem-
ory exist (Parker et al. 2006). William James once remarked: “Selection is the very
keel on which our mental ship is built. And in this case of memory its utility is
obvious. If we remembered everything, we should be on most occasions be as ill off
as if we remembered nothing” (James 2007, p. 680). Even apart from cases of
complete memorizers, accurate recall is not always beneficial. One does not need to
subscribe to controversial Freudian notions like repression or psychological
defenses to acknowledge that too much of the past can burden the present.1
Remembering all unpleasant or embarrassing moments is not conducive to well-
being. Especially autobiographical memory seems to be selective. Attenuating or
amplifying particular memories helps to maintain a coherent and positive
self-image (Conway 2005). Reversely, goal-directed forgetting in the service of
personal needs lets us see the past with misty eyes (Harris et al. 2010, p. 254).
Remembering and forgetting are thus complementary processes and we should not
overvalue one while depreciating the other.
1A contemporary review of repression theory; see Erdelyi (2006).
82 A Duty to Remember, a Right to Forget? Memory Manipulations and the Law 1281
Interventions into Memory
We have to leave it here with this brief introduction to memory research and turn to
what is relevant for normative purposes: interventions modulating memory. It goes
without saying that our conscious powers over memory are limited. In recent years,
several novel interventions have been studied that affect the fate of recently
acquired memory traces and that might also afford altering more remote memories.
Although most research is still in its infancy, the prospect that novel insights into
the working of the memory systems and novel intervention techniques may allow to
alter memories seems warranted in principle.2 These are exciting times for memory
researchers even though for safety and ethical reasons, many of the interventions
studied in animals will never be carried out in humans.
Three main goals for interventions into memory are conceivable: enhancing
memories through improving encoding and retrieval; diminishing memories
through inhibiting recall, erasing traces, or attenuating emotional aspects; or chang-
ing contents of memories. Generally, interventions into memory are possible in all
phases: before or during memory acquisition, consolidation, or recall – and, perhaps
most interestingly, even after recall during reconsolidation. Moreover, case reports
of patients with deficits in particular memory functions suggest that specific
memory systems might be targeted individually.3
A growing body of research seeks to enhance memory by different means,
mostly by improving information encoding or consolidation. A powerful natural
way to enhance memory is emotional arousal which leads to increased release of
stress hormones such as noradrenalin and cortisol that enhance encoding and
consolidation but can interfere with retrieval (Joëls et al. 2011). Some common
drugs have both memory enhancing and impairing effects, depending on the time of
application: Benzodiazepines, for instance, impair memory anterogradely when
taken before but enhance memory retrogradely when taken after encoding (pre-
sumably through reducing interference with later incoming information)
(Beracochea 2006). The public debate on memory enhancement focuses mainly
on pharmaceuticals, but most drugs currently in use in humans fail to exhibit overly
impressive beneficial effects on memory (Repantis (2010a, b; Husain and
Mehta 2011; Lynch et al. 2011). Several non-pharmacological memory enhancers
have been demonstrated to be similarly or even more effective than drugs,
e.g., nutritional supplements, physical exercise, sleep, mnemonic strategies, or
brain stimulation.4
2There will be many obstacles, especially in targeting specific memories; see, e.g., Levy (2007),
Ch. 5.
3The most famous patient is the recently deceased H.M., c.f. Corkin (2002).
4For a broad overview c.f. Dresler et al. 2012; for nutrition c.f. Smith et al. (2011), Nehlig (2010);
for exercise c.f. Roig et al. (2013), Hötting and Röder (2013); for sleep c.f. Rasch and Born (2013),
Genzel et al. (2014); for mnemonics c.f. Karpicke and Roediger (2008), Worthen and Hunt (2010);
for brain stimulation c.f. Coffman et al. (2014), Suthana and Fried (2014).
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Different strategies exist for diminishing memories. Forgetting is the often
unintended but natural fate of most memories. There are some indications that inten-
tional forgetting of selected memories might be possible, a phenomenon called
“directed forgetting” (Geraerts and McNally 2008). For emotional memories like
conditioned fear, unlearning procedures (i.e., fear extinction) have long been
established and have attracted renewed interest recently. Notably, however, most fear
extinction procedures do not erase memory traces but merely inhibit recall through
a newly learned safety memory (Myers and Davis 2007; Vervliet et al. 2013).
A primary target for interventions are emotions that accompany memories,
particularly painful and stressful emotions related to memories of traumatic events.
In most persons who have experienced trauma, the emotional tone of the memory
with time disconnects from the factual memory, a process in which sleep plays
a crucial role (Walker and van der Helm 2009). Some persons, however, develop
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), a pathological condition characterized by
anxiety, easily recurring and hard to suppress memories of traumatic events,
flashbacks, emotional numbing, or hyperarousal, as well as behavioral changes
such as evasion of particular people or places.5 The powerful and persistent
memories are caused by stress hormones released during the traumatic event
which lead to an overconsolidation of memory traces (Pitman 1989; Glannon
2006). Most therapies aim to blunt the strong emotions associated with the factual
content of the memory. However, insofar as the original memory trace is not
replaced but only its recall inhibited, relapse is a common problem (Vervliet
et al. 2013). Novel interventions might open new routes for prevention and treat-
ment of PTSD. Substances could be administered to persons before they will be
exposed to potentially traumatic situations (rescue workers) or immediately after
they have experienced, e.g., sexual assault; or in therapeutic settings during
reconsolidation of reactivated traumatic memories (President’s Council on Bioeth-
ics 2003; Donovan 2010; Poundja et al. 2012; Schiller et al. 2010). Consolidation
and reconsolidation of emotional memories have been successfully targeted with
the b-adrenergic blocker propranolol (Cahill et al. 1994; Kindt et al. 2009). In pilot
studies, tampering with (re)consolidation processes has successfully reduced PTSD
symptoms, but larger studies have yet to replicate these effects (Pitman et al. 2002;
Vaiva et al. 2003; meta-analysis by Lonergan et al. 2013). Whether these interven-
tions only diminish emotional aspects or affect factual recall is unclear at present.6
5For the biological side of PTSD, see Pitman et al. (2012).
6Some researchers speak of “erasing emotional memories” by which they mean erasure of the
emotional aspect only, while ethicists often speak indiscriminately of “blunting” of painful
memories. These conceptual ambiguities might lead to misunderstandings and depend on the
conception of memory traces. Cf. Holmes et al. (2010). For present purposes, it is only important
that emotional and factual contents could, at least to some degree, be targeted and modified
independently from each other.
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The strongest form of memory manipulation is complete memory erasure. The
first point for intervention is blocking initial consolidation to prevent information in
short-term memory from being stabilized and transferred into long-term memory. It
is also possible to intervene at later stages: During the labile phase upon recall,
reconsolidation could be impaired or prevented (Pitman 2011; Parsons and Ressler
2013). In animal studies, blockade of both consolidation and reconsolidation has
been repeatedly demonstrated by inhibiting protein synthesis in memory-related
brain regions (Dudai 1996; McGaugh 2000; Nader at al. 2000; Alberini et al. 2006;
Shema et al. 2007; Sacktor 2008). In humans, reconsolidation of episodic memory
has been disrupted, e.g., through emotionally aversive stimuli or electroconvulsive
therapy applied immediately after retrieval (Strange et al. 2010, Kroes et al. 2014).7
Another form of intervention changes contents of memories. The process of
selective consolidation of a fraction of our experience and the repeated
reconsolidation of these memory traces suggests that our memories may be less
veridical than we expect. This intriguing view is backed by a long line of false
memory research, most notably by Elizabeth Loftus, in which the content of
memories could be altered or new memories implanted through various and quite
simple means such as telling false stories about the past or suggestive questioning
(Loftus 2003; Brainerd and Reyna 2005). In animal studies, false memories were
implanted through sophisticated optogenetic interventions at the molecular level
(Ramirez et al. 2013). The extent to which our memories deviate from our original
experience cannot be reliably estimated at present, both in terms of false parts
within a (by and large) correct memory and the overall amount of false memories.
In general, the possibility of false memories is not the same as proving that many
are indeed false. Supposedly, humans are capable of remembering many things
correctly. Otherwise, the preservation of our memory system through natural
selection appears unlikely (Schacter 1995, p. 25). However, Loftus’ studies dem-
onstrate that distrust in memory is warranted and that we can never be sure whether
our recollections are correct – regardless of how vivid and familiar they appear to
us. These findings have legal implications, especially for evaluation of eyewitness
testimony and interrogative procedures (Schacter and Loftus 2013; British Psycho-
logical Society 2008; Nadel and Sinnott-Armstrong 2012).
Ethics of Memory
The ethics of memory is a fascinating topic that has received little attention yet
(Cf. Blustein 2008; Margalit 2002). How should we remember – what, whom, and
7The current state of research in humans is less consistent than in animals, partly due to the
complexity of interactions between different memory systems during reconsolidation; for a review
c.f. Schiller and Phelps (2011).
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in which way? How often and intense should we, for instance, reminisce about late
family members? To whom do we owe duties of remembrance, to ourselves or the
person remembered? Should we try to forget particular persons or events or, by
contrast, struggle against the natural decay of memories by fabricating cues and
records? All these questions converge to the more general one: To which degree
should the past influence the present? Answers have to take our limited powers over
memory into account. But in a time when technologies may confer more control
over remembering and forgetting and turn them into matters of choice, ethics of
memory becomes an important issue.
The prospect of manipulating memory beyond our natural abilities has sparked
the imagination of authors and artists from antiquity to modern days.8 Although
different interventions raise different questions and deserve detailed treatment on
their own, some ethical worries apply to all of them (we loosely speak of “altering”
memories). On the level of the individual, two ideas pull into opposite directions:
For one, historical truthfulness speaks in favor of maintaining accurate recollec-
tions of the past. It finds support in prominent ethical ideas such as the ancient
“know thyself.” By contrast, well-being and the pursuit of happiness may favor
altering memories – even forgetting unpleasant ones – over accurateness. In both
cases, memory serves as an instrument for cherished but potentially conflicting
ethical ideals.
A good example of the first position is formulated by the US President’s
Council of Bioethics in its report “Beyond Therapy.” It presents a balanced over-
view of potential benefits and pitfalls of memory alterations and placed the topic on
the scholarly agenda. It has nonetheless attracted much criticism for its
bioconservative stance and its (rather suggestive) conclusions. The Council
expresses deep concerns over any form of memory alteration, including interven-
tions that numb traumatic memories of PTSD patients: “Our memories make us
who we are. By ‘rewriting’ memories pharmacologically we might succeed in
easing real suffering at the risk of falsifying our perception of the world and
undermining our true identify” (p. 227).9
Remembering Fitly and Truly
As an ethical standard, the Council suggests “remembering fitly and truly” (p. 228),
unfortunately without stating more clearly what “fitly and truly” means, what it
implies or in which relation both criteria stand. “Fitly and truly” is presumably best
understood as remembering appropriately and accurately and rules out falsifying,
8Cf. movies like Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind.
9Cf. Parens (2010) who reads the Council as not being opposed to PTSD treatment.
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forgetting, or dampening memories. Prima facie, this appears to be an agreeable
position. But let us explore it a bit deeper. Any obligation to remember accurately
faces the problem that human memory is selective and distortive. Emphasizing
accurateness would oblige us to rehearse memories that tend to be forgotten and
dissuade us from romanticizing or glorifying the past. Consequently, interventions
that improve true recall and diminish distortive effects should be endorsed. This,
however, stands in some contrast to the spirit of the report, critical of any techno-
logical alteration of natural human abilities.
Eric Parens usefully suggests understanding “remembering fitly” in the
following way: The intensity of memories and accompanying emotions have to
stand in some relation to the magnitude of the event that caused them (Parens 2010).
This criterion brings us some way in clearly disproportional cases. However,
assessing the significance of events as well as adequate (emotional) responses is
itself a value judgment in need of further criteria. What, for instance, is the
appropriate response to the death of a friend, the breakup of intimate relationships,
or embarrassing experiences? Hard to tell. And by whose standards? (Cf. Henry
et al. 2007, p. 17) This is particularly important in regard to reactions to traumatic
memories such as deep prolonged sadness and loss of trust or interest in mundane
things. These might be quite appropriate responses to preceding events such as
having gone through war or being sexually assaulted. In fact, how could we simply
revert back to normality and enjoy life’s pleasures after living through such
experiences? Even if affected persons were haunted by memories for years, their
reaction is not evidently disproportionate to the magnitude of the event. The
problem with traumatic memories is not so much that they are inappropriate to
the past but that they may lead to a dysfunctional life in the future. “Fit” and
“functional,” though closely related, have different reference points: appropriate
vis-à-vis the past or a flourishing life in the future.
This leads us to the third ethical ideal which a US American Council cannot
but recognize: the pursuit of happiness. The Council contends that remembering
fitly and truly is a precondition for living a flourishing life. But this is dubious – at
least, but not only – with respect to traumatic memories. The Council’s argument
heavily draws on the idea that there is something like “real happiness,” different
from feelings of pleasure, which requires coherence between the world and
subjective feelings. Indeed, we should be skeptical about superficial happiness,
gained only for the price of separation from reality and may (mis)appropriate
Theodor Adorno’s famous saying here that there is no real living in a false life.
But albeit distrust against superficial false consciousness is warranted, it is hard
to get around the fact that certain memories are debilitating which is not
a desirable state and that memory alterations could assist overcoming inner
obstacles grounded in the past. The resulting flourishing life might not be so
“unreal” or “false” that it is not worth having. While the Council claims that
happiness and remembering fitly and truly are parts of the same coin, we suspect
they are different ideals that can come in conflict with each other. Out of this
tension, the real challenge arises: Are we obliged to remember fitly and truly even
though it impairs a flourishing life?
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Identity
In the background of the argument stands the worry that memory alterations threaten
identity. Indeed our autobiographical memories make us who we are. If taken away
from us, we would be stripped from something fundamentally ours, deprived of some
kind of access to ourselves – our autobiography. Nonetheless, the importance of
every single memory should not be overstated. We all forget a myriad of things and
events on natural ways without loosening our identity. Why should this be qualita-
tively different if we forget at will? Furthermore, a well-considered decision to erase
memories might itself be an expression of one’s personality.
Worries over identity are a common topic in bioethical debates. It has proven
useful to differentiate between several meanings. The strongest form, diachronic
identity, concerns the continual existence of a person, i.e., the conditions under
which a person at one point in time can be reidentified as the very same person at
a later point. In the wake of John Locke, some argue that autobiographical memory,
experiential knowledge of one’s past, is a necessary condition for personal persis-
tence over time.10 This implies that loss of autobiographical memory leads to
a fissure in persistence: The new person is, in a strong sense, a different person,
while the old one has vanished.11 Accordingly, Alzheimer’s patients suffering from
irreversible memory loss would be numerically distinct from the persons that
inhabited their bodies before onset of the disease. While the tragedy of dementia-
related erosion of personality is indeed a striking example of memory’s importance,
it also points to a weakness of the memory criterion. Theory aside, we usually
identify the old lady who cannot remember her past as our grandmother who raised
us as kids and therefore feel (and are) obliged to care for her.
As any theory of diachronic identity has to allow for the ordinary degree of
forgetting, interventions such as numbing or erasing particular memories will regu-
larly not call it into question (although the Council suggests otherwise). Yet, a weaker
sense of identity, closer to the colloquial use, might be affected: one’s personality.
Everyone has a past, and this past cannot be undone. If memories of our past make us
who we are, changing our memories may change us. The question is whether altering
our personality in this way is wrong. Essentialist thinkers urge that one should
preserve rather than “betray” who one is. By contrast, existentialist-minded positions
hold that we should be authors of our life, actively shaping our future in light of
attractive self-images, even if that implies radical departure from former personality
traits (Cf. Bublitz and Merkel 2009; Erler 2011). The wrongness of “betraying” who
one was in the quest of creating a more desirable future version of oneself can hardly
be found in claims of the former personality against its successors. Instead, it needs to
be grounded in present interests of the person. In their pursuit, anyone attracted to
10In Locke (1979), he wrote of the “sameness of consciousness,” traditionally understood as the
memory criterion, but see, e.g., Strawson (2011).
11For more elaborated treatments on the relation between identity and memory, see Parfit (1984),
DeGrazia (2005), Schechtman (2005), Galert and Hartmann (2007).
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existentialist approaches may seek to alter the way she reacts to her past, including
her memories, and concede historical untruthfulness for the sake of personal devel-
opment. Abandoning parts of one’s past is not tantamount to abandoning any
personality, but altering it. Objections are thus convincing only if self-development
is intrinsically wrong or if freeing oneself from one’s past is counterproductive to that
end. Given that many people seek to change the courses of their life and their way of
being, often for the better, a wholesale rejection of self-creation appears implausible.
Self-Growth
Perhaps, shaping one’s future through cutting links to one’s past is doomed to
failure. We take this to be primarily a psychological hypothesis. Without doubt,
coming to terms with oneself and one’s past is among life’s major challenges. But
might forgetting or editing memories not be part of it? Especially theories of
“narrative identity” emphasize the constructive processes in personality formation.
Persons compose stories about themselves, woven from various sources such as
their recollections, beliefs, self-image, perception by others, and expectations and
aspirations for the future (Cf. Galert and Hartmann 2007). Interestingly, studies
suggest that persons tend to evaluate their past not truthfully but in ways conducive
to well-being, by embellishing or depreciating it. Putting one’s former self in
a negative light might – just as downward social comparison – make one feel better
about the present (Wilson and Ross 2001). Forgetting, selective remembering, and
waning emotional reactions are thus to some degree ordinary processes that do not
necessarily impair construing meaningful and functional narratives about oneself –
they even seem to be regular features (Bell 2008). Then, truthfulness to the past
might not be a central condition for self-development.12 While this does not imply
that editing memories is ethically advisable, it shows that it is not an insurmount-
able obstacle for self-development.
Nonetheless, those who cannot draw upon their history might indeed be bound to
repeat it. This old wisdom seems to have a neuroscientific analogy: Findings suggest
that persons with memory deficits also have difficulties in prospective planning
because the same brain systems are involved in both tasks. Scientists speculate that
the (evolutionary) aim of remembering is not accurate reproduction of the past but
rather simulation of the future.13 Be this as it may, engaging with one’s past can be
extremely beneficial for personality development. It helps to understand where one
comes from and enables learning from (unpleasant) experience and developing strat-
egies to deal with stressful events and ordinary nuisances of life. Accordingly, when we
lose our history, we lose opportunities for self-growth. This may even be true for
12Some memory disorders impair forming a sense of self, e.g., Klein et al. (2004).
13The “constructive nature of episodic memory is attributable, at least in part, to the role of the
episodic system in allowing us to mentally simulate our personal futures,” Schacter and Addis
(2007), p. 779, Schacter et al. (2007).
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traumatic events which can acquire meaning in retrospect. Some traumatized persons
experience “posttraumatic growth” and steer their life in novel directions (Calhoun and
Tedeschi 2006). Blunting or erasing memories may block such developments. Yet,
even though people give meaning to horrible events, it remains doubtful whether there
is meaning to, e.g., being the victim of serious crimes. Presumably, giving meaning to
tragedy is more a strategy for coping with emotional turmoil. Painful events should not
be glorified because of potential positive side effects. Memory alterations could
provide alternative ways of overcoming the shadows of the past and freeing up the
inner resources that arduously working through trauma exhausts. But while therapeutic
forgetting may have much to recommend, concerns that memory alterations could be
used to overcome minor troubles and impair personal growth seem warranted, espe-
cially in light of notorious human traits such as impatience and discounting long-term
drawbacks in favor of short-term benefits.
Finally, it should be reminded that even full memory erasure cannot ensure
escaping one’s past as long as others retain their recollections.14 The fact that others
know more about a person than she herself does can lead to bizarre and uncomfort-
able situations which might be worse than retaining the original memory. And we can
learn from patients suffering from involuntary memory loss that many persons would
feel urged to find out as much about their history as possible. Then, memory erasure
would be self-contradictory.
After all, the question about the extent to which the past should influence the
future touches upon an amalgam of potentially conflicting ethical ideals, none of
which can claim strict priority. Remembering fitly and truly is neither conceptually
nor empirically a necessary condition for a flourishing life. Corresponding norma-
tive demands may speak in favor of manipulating natural abilities which do not live
up to those ethical ideals. Nonetheless, memory alterations pose various dangers,
many uses appear imprudent and should be discouraged. In spite of this, there are
potential benefits. In the end, much depends on the kind of memory altered, precise
effects of interventions, as well as psychological and social consequences. These
aspects cannot be determined a priori but have to be cautiously explored
empirically.
Memory & the Law
The perspectives of law and ethics differ in important ways. The law does not
provide answers about what is morally advisable to do. Unlike moral advice, legal
provisions are binding for all. Neutral and pluralist democracies should not seek to
impose on citizens contested views of a good life but enable the peaceful coexis-
tence of diverging life plans. Specific legal provisions have to conform to higher
level principles that give form to the structure of legal norms, primarily those
deriving from constitutional and human rights law. Deeply entrenched in liberal
14In-depth discussions of further ethical aspects are Levy (2007) and Liao and Sandberg (2008).
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rights is the idea that persons enjoy wide ranging autonomy in self-regarding
matters, which entails the liberty to make imprudent and immoral decisions.
The realm of legal freedoms is thus not coextensive with the morally good.
Because of this, legal paternalism is highly contested, at least in theory
(see, e.g., Feinberg 1986). In practice, most legal systems allow hard paternal-
ism in order to prevent severe self-harm. Furthermore, legal rights are under-
stood here as prima facie entitlements that have to be balanced against
countervailing rights of others or legitimate public interests before final judg-
ments can be made. Finally, since legal systems and cultures differ widely, the
following has to remain on an abstract level and might not apply to every
jurisdiction to the same degree.
In most countries, the use of memory-altering substances or tools is regulated by
different legal provisions. Pharmaceuticals such as propranolol or antidementia
drugs are scheduled substances which require prescription. Tools like brain stim-
ulation devices fall under different regulations, while mnemonic training, physical
exercise, meditation, or sleep are not regulated at all. Many provisions that restrict
access to specific means are not enacted in virtue of their effects on memory but for
other reasons. Current regulations based on means may thus appear incoherent sub
specie memory and might be reexamined in view of present knowledge.
In general, only few legal provisions directly pertain to mental states. At least in
theory, strong human rights such as freedom of conscience and thought place some
parts of the mind outside the reach of governmental control.15Memory, however, is
among the exceptions. States have always had legitimate interests in acquiring
knowledge about the past. Every citizen can be summoned to testify as a witness
and this may entail the duty to remember correctly.
Two rights are noteworthy: Mental health, a human right, e.g., under the
European Convention of Human Rights,16 affords citizens claims against states to
refrain from actions that inflict mental harm and to protect them against such
actions by private parties. Thereby it provides protection against infliction of
memory disorders that amount to mental health problems. In addition, curbing
access to effective (and relatively safe) treatments of mental disorders would
interfere with the right to mental health. Consequently, it appears unlikely that
courts would consider the promotion of ethical ideas such as truthfulness to one’s
past as sufficiently grave interests to justify, e.g., prolonged suffering from PTSD.
Moreover, some aspects of memory concern issues of identity and personhood
and may therefore relate to human dignity.17 For instance, retrograde amnesia or
personality dissolving effects of advanced Alzheimer’s can undermine dignity
(make a dignified life almost impossible). Respect for dignity not only implies
the obvious – a strict prohibition to contribute to severe memory loss – but might
15Art. 9 ECHR, Art. 18 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
16Art. 8 ECHR, e.g., Bensaid v. UK, App.No: 44599/98, 6.5.2001.
17Although not always codified and subject to controversy, human dignity is often understood as
the overarching principle of human rights law.
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also oblige states to prevent the onset of these diseases, e.g., by providing access to
antidementia treatment. However, the extent of positive obligations in general and
to health care in particular varies greatly from country to country.
Freedom of Memory
Interventions into memory not directly related to dignity or health might not be
adequately captured by current law. Defining novel, memory-specific regulations
could soon become a challenge for lawmakers and legal theorists. As a starting
point, Adam Kolber has proposed to acknowledge a novel right, “freedom of
memory,” which he describes as a “yet poorly defined bundle of rights to control
what happens to our memories” (Kolber 2006, p. 1622; Kolber 2008). We concur
with Kolber’s proposal. Freedom of memory follows straightforwardly from the
general presumption of liberty and is part of the special protection of the person,
arguably the foundational concern of human rights law. In the following, we shall
give some contours to the idea and sketch issues future scholarship has to address.
Scope of the Right
Right to Remember
Our strongest interest in memory is remembering our past, to preserve biographical
events against sinking into oblivion. In virtue of its significance, it deserves
heightened legal protection. On a basal level freedom of memory thus entails the
right to remember.18 It guarantees that persons are entitled to use their powers of
memory at will. This right corresponds with a duty of others to refrain from
interfering with memory. Interventions that impair memory such as electroconvul-
sive therapy or pharmaceuticals interfere with this right and require strong justifi-
cation if administered without consent. We suggest, as a rule of thumb, that the right
to remember is stronger – and more likely outweighs countervailing interests – the
higher the relevance of particular memories or capacities for construing
a meaningful and truthful life narrative.
In addition, the right has to protect accurate memories against distortive influ-
ences. Courts were confronted with this issue in repressed memories cases in the
1990s. According to some psychological theories, repressed traumatic childhood
experiences can be recovered through explorative psychological procedures. Upon
undergoing such treatments, some patients remembered that they were sexually
abused as children and brought claims against ostensible perpetrators. These mem-
ories often turned out to be false. They were not recovered but (negligently)
implanted by psychotherapists through suggestive techniques such as hypnosis,
guided imagery, drugs, and positive feedback for reports of memories with abusive
18A right to remember does of course not entail a duty to remember.
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content (Cf. Loftus and Ketcham 1996; Brainerd and Reyna 2005, Ch. 7). At times
patients recalled bizarre events such as satanic ritual abuse and group rape. More
astonishingly, even some alleged perpetrators confessed horrible crimes which they
never committed, only because suggestive police interrogations implanted
false memories.19 For lack of reliability and scientific consensus, courts grew
reluctant to admit evidence of repressed memories. Today, chances of conviction
based on testimonies from recovered memories without further corroborative
evidence are low.
These cases raised the question whether patients or the wrongly accused have
causes of action against therapists. The patient–psychotherapist relation is subject
to contract law; therapists have to provide treatment de lege artis, according to
standards of medical practice, which were arguably not observed in these cases. At
least, methods that potentially alter memory should, just as physical interventions
into bodies, require informed consent. Patients have to be informed about the
scientific status of the repressed memory paradigm and the risk of false memories.
Implanting false memories may thus give rise to malpractice suits.
Moreover, the work of Loftus demonstrates that false memories can be
implanted outside of psychotherapeutic contexts. To capture such cases, the law
would have to establish noncontractual duties of care toward other persons’ mem-
ories. The problematic point is that false information can suffice to distort
memories, but as misinformation is virtually everywhere, it can by itself hardly
warrant tort claims (Morgan et al. 2013). The law has to tailor more narrow duties
for persons with special responsibilities such as interrogating police officers.
Implanting memories not as innocuous as the one’s used in research, e.g., having
been lost in a mall as a kid, should suffice to ground tort claims (e.g., infliction of
mental distress, a tort accepted in some but not all jurisdictions).20
Protection Against Erasure
Furthermore, the law should provide protection against unwanted memory erasure
even when it does not lead to mental distress. Walter Glannon discusses a real case
in point, here in a slightly modified form21: For removal of suspicious tissue,
a patient has consented to local anesthesia and, if necessary, for full sedation.
During surgery, the locally anesthetized patient overhears the pathologists diag-
nosing “bad cancer” and starts to panic. The doctor injects her propofol, sometimes
called “milk of amnesia” because it induces short-term anterograde amnesia
through blocking initial memory consolidation. After waking up, the doctor tells
the patient the surgery has gone smoothly and reveals her devastating diagnosis in
the following days.
19In a famous case, the accused confessed the murder of 25 infants after authorities pressured him
to remember the events; cf. Levy (2007).
20A further question is whether third parties – the accused – can bring claims against therapist. In
the landmark case Ramona v. Isabella, the court granted a wrongly accused father remedies; see
Mullins (1996).
21Glannon (2010), 240f. The case is taken from TIME, Oct. 15th 2007.
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This is a case of genuine memory erasure, but instead of causing distress the
intervention temporarily relieves it. Similarly, perpetrators could erase memories of
victims so that they are unable to identify them which could have the positive effect
of preventing PTSD. Without causing mental distress, these interventions might not
fall within the scope of currently accepted torts. In that case, tort law should be
expanded to outlaw unwanted memory erasure regardless of its negative or positive
consequences. Because of their importance, lawmakers may even consider to
render the unwatend erasure of memories into a criminal offense (Bublitz and
Merkel 2014). Of course, memory erasure might be justifiable in exceptional
cases (arguably in the one discussed by Glannon).
Right to Enhance Memory
In the 1950s, Wilder Penfield pioneered experimental stimulation of the brain.
Electrical stimulation of the temporal lobes evoked vivid memories of events
long forgotten. At least, this is what patients reported. As those memories were
never verified, they might have been mere fantasies (Schacter 1995, p. 12). How-
ever, more precise stimulation and better insights into memory traces could afford
new ways to explore buried memories, and, so we suppose for the sake of argument,
sufficiently veridical ones. Should persons have a right to undergo such procedures?
Other means that potentially enhance memory such as the nontherapeutic use of
antidementia drugs or mnemonic training raise structurally similar questions. Given
widespread complaints about the fallibility of memory and the natural curiosity
about one’s past, a high demand for effective memory enhancements can be
expected. As part of the struggle against episodes of one’s life fading away and
becoming irrecoverable, the use of enhancements falls within the scope of the right
to remember. It is neither conceptually nor normatively confined to our limited
natural powers of recall. It guarantees remembering as one pleases which implies
a permission to employ memory-aiding tools. Restricting access to such tools
interferes with the right.
Limits
These interferences could be justified. As a form of cognitive enhancement, mem-
ory-boosting tools face many of the ethical objections reviewed elsewhere in this
volume. Apart from issues of safety, efficacy, and undesirable consequences of
overly perfect memories, ethical and social concerns may justify limiting freedom
of memory. However, in light of the importance of memory and the fact that our
natural powers are limited – at times, tools may be the only way to acquire access to
one’s past – countervailing interests would have to meet a high threshold. Social
interests strong enough to outweigh, e.g., the interest to remember significant
events of one’s life are hard to imagine.
Furthermore, restrictions of modern versions of the ancient ars memoriae such
as mnemonic training seem hardly justifiable, although they may e.g., give
a competitive edge in the job market. Access to pharmaceuticals can be regulated
in virtue of side effects, but unless considerable negative effects on individuals or
society at large are expected, doctors should be free to prescribe them. The liberty
82 A Duty to Remember, a Right to Forget? Memory Manipulations and the Law 1293
to use memory enhancements becomes even stronger insofar as they have preven-
tive effects against memory decay in the future.
In extraordinary cases, freedom of memory might find its limits in legitimate
interests of others that some events be forgotten (Kolber 2006). Think about an
offender’s vivid memories of how he humiliated and abused a victim. Victims may
have the understandable wish that these memories shall not persist. Yet, these
memories may also be important for offenders (e.g., for coming to terms with
their deeds). If means to erase particular memories become available, the law needs
to strike balances between these interests. Apart from such extreme cases, the right
to remember regularly prevails over social interests to forget.
Right to Forget
Asmemory is the interplay between recall and forgetting, the freedom of memory also
entails the right to not remember and even to forget. Again, good ethical reasons may
speak against intentional forgetting, but legal freedoms do not coincide with the realm
of the morally advisable. Only severe self-harm can be prohibited on paternalistic
grounds.
Not Being Reminded of Something
A right to forget entails that others do not have claims against the rightholder to
remember. Therefore, the romantic promise of lovers to never forget a precious
moment (and each other) cannot be understood as a binding and enforceable legal
contract. Moreover, in our quest to forget, we try, to suppress thinking about
particular persons or events. Often in vain, as we are inadvertently reminded of
them by external audiovisual or olfactory cues. The right to forget cannot protect
against being reminded as this would restrict other persons’ freedoms, e.g., the right
to speak about issues others are not pleased being reminded of. Only particular
means of evoking memories in others can run afoul of freedom of memory such as
unwanted electrical stimulation of the brain. Unlike speaking, no one is entitled to
directly interfere with another person’s brain. Even if such interventions were free
of side effects, the elicitation of unwanted memories by itself violates freedom of
memory. Between speech and brain stimulation lies a grey area of ways to stir up
another person’s memories, e.g., through placing cues in public places. But if
elicitation of memories were sufficient ground for banning cues from the public,
all kinds of stimuli would have to be removed. The public sphere, however,
attended to by different persons with different sensitivities, must remain a place
for free expression even if some take offense. A different conclusion might be
warranted in special cases, such as a graffiti artist who intentionally places symbols
that trigger traumatic memories in the social environment of abuse victims (such
cases do exist). It is not the illegitimate appropriation of the public for personal
purposes but the intentional elicitation of memories that can ground claims in those
cases. In general, PTSD and stressful memories are a growing field of litigation, and
the law seems more willing to accept such claims, providing some protection for
peace of mind, although scope and limits remain to be worked out in detail
(Shen 2012).
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Intentional Forgetting
While freedom of memory cannot protect against exposure to any memory cue, it
encompasses the right to forget through straightforward measures. Umberto Eco
once pointed to an asymmetry between the ars memoriae and ars oblivionalis
(Eco 1998). While we can establish associations and cues to remember, there is
no analog method to forget. Although some indirect strategies to suppress unwanted
memories exist (Anderson and Green 2001), forgetting is, by and large, not under
our conscious control. The advent of consolidation-blocking substances could
change this, and their use would fall under freedom of memory. But, just like any
other freedom, it can be limited by countervailing interests.
Paternalistic Limits: Erasure of Autobiographical Memory
Let us briefly turn to one example of justifiable paternalism: complete erasure of
autobiographical memory. It may sound like mockery to the ears of those who suffer
from severe memory loss, but some persons may seek to completely eradicate their
autobiographical memory. At present, there are no means to do so, but tragic
examples of brain lesions prove that it is possible in principle. Suppose an interven-
tion erases memory without impeding the capacity to store new information. In the
great majority of cases, availing oneself of such means would be an imprudent
decision that causes more harm than relief and states should step in. However,
cases are conceivable in which even this radical memory modification appears as
an understandable wish, all things considered, e.g., if tragic circumstances have come
over the person which were not of her own making and severely obstruct a flourishing
life in the future. To some, autobiographical memory erasure disrupts diachronic
identity and it might be conceived as a minor form of suicide.22 Countries that
tolerate or assist suicide might, in order to prevent suicide, discuss regulations and
procedures for such interventions, bizarre as they may appear at first glance.
Limits: Collective Memory
The tempting short-term relief provided by memory modifications might come at the
price of negative long-term effects on personal development for which paternalistic
restrictions seem warranted. We cannot delve deeper into this contentious issue here
and shall turn to limits which derive from interests of the common good. A recurring
theme in the debate concerns the effects of memory alterations on collective memory.
The Council argues that “our own memory is not merely our own; it is part of the
fabric of society in which we live” and pictures the social consequences of memory
dampening by asking: “What kind of people would we be if we did not want to
remember the Holocaust, if we sought to make the anguish simply go away?” (p. 231)
The Council concedes that “we cannot and should not force those who live through
great trauma to endure its painful memory for the benefit of the rest of us.” Yet, rather
22The law would probably not accept changes in numerical identity and still consider the person as
the same as she was before erasure of autobiographical memory with respect to, e.g., financial
obligations. Whether persons can still be punished for crimes committed before is a more intricate
question, see, e.g., Dufner (2013).
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than concluding that victims should be free to forget painful events, the Council
suggests that society should compassionately suffer with victims instead.
The Council worries that atrocities and outrageous crimes could simply be
forgotten and that victims would no longer seek to redress injustice. In that case,
we would indeed be morally bankrupt. However, if we listen to the stories of
(traumatized) survivors, the assumption that they could have chosen to forget if
they only had effective means at their disposal seems misplaced. On the contrary,
many seem to have derived the strength to survive from what they conceived as
their moral duty: to tell the world what has happened and to seek justice, in the
name and in memoriam of those brutally murdered. The engraving on the Holocaust
Museum, “for the dead and the living, we must bear witness,” seems to express
a deep existential commitment rather than an externally imposed duty. In the Oath
of Buchenwald, survivors declared “it was one thought that kept us alive: the time
for revenge will come” and pledged to “take up the fight until the last culprit stands
before the judges of the people.”23 For many, forgetting has never been an option.24
However, we shall refrain from speculating about personal motivations of survivors
because atrocities might simply not be the right angle for framing general
discussions of memory alterations. How to come to terms with singular historical
catastrophes far exceeds present parameters, and such events may not lend
themselves to generalizations. We suppose that one can unconditionally endorse
the imperative to never forget the Holocaust but still argue about manipulating
memory in minor cases. Those we shall have in mind in the following.
The Council contends that memories are not “merely our own”, not at one’s free
disposal because they are part of collective memory, and, further, that forgetting or
numbing could impair or render impossible fulfilling collective duties of remem-
brance. However, the contested, perhaps only metaphorically useful concept of
collective memory seems to be misleading.25 Individual memories are the sources
from which communities weave the stories about their past. The construction of
these social narratives parallels individual memories in interesting ways: It pursues
goals, primarily strengthening collective identities, not necessarily historical truth-
fulness. Parts of history are embellished, others are left out; stories are retold and
rearranged through cultural and commemorative events in the service of present
interests. Accordingly, historians speak of memory distortions on the collective
level, too (Schudson 1995). Normatively, however, the fact that individual memo-
ries are sources of collective remembrance does not make them “memories of the
community,” nor do communities derive claims to access or preservation simply
from the fact that they can utilize them. Arguments in this vein presuppose that
23Oath of Buchenwald, April 19, 1945.
24How to reconcile the duty toward memory with the need to forget is a central theme for
Holocaust survivors; cf. the writings of Elie Wiesel, e.g., his Nobel lecture, Dec. 11, 1986
(www.nobelprize.org).
25See Ricoeur’s (2004), p. 120 discussion of Halbwachs’ ideas who coined the term collective
memory.
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individuals are obliged to contribute to forming collective identities and facilitating
collective goals. This might be a moral duty, but not a legal one.
Regarding duties of remembrance, an ambiguity of the concept “remember” might
be at play. Collectively remembering historical events is not the same as individuals
reexperiencing the past. The former means, e.g., drawing lessons from history, paying
tribute to involved persons, and commemorating the dead. It does not mean, by
contrast, that the collective or any individual entertains an autonoetic, first-person
memory. The collective duty is independent from, and can be fulfilled without,
autobiographical recollections.26 Because of this, collective memories of historical
events can be kept alive even when all contemporary witnesses have passed away.
Erasure of individuals’ memories does not automatically affect collective memory.
Surely, oral accounts of moral witnesses can support collective remembrance, and they
may have a moral duty to testify. But if witnesses cannot, as the Council concedes, be
compelled to painfully remember for the benefit of society, their testimony should be
encouraged but ultimately left to their discretion.
Social Interests: Witness Testimony
In this regard, the law is stricter. Irrespective of painfulness, it imposes duties to
remember on witnesses for the benefit of the common good, more precisely, for
purposes of law enforcement.27 In many jurisdictions, the failure of a summoned
witness to testify accurately constitutes punishable offenses. The law has to rely on
witnesses. For lack of other obtainable evidence, testimony plays an important part
in various legal proceedings. Memory alterations could impair the accuracy of
testimony, fact-finding, and the administration of justice. For reasons of a fair
trial, testimonies have to be given before a judge or a jury and be called into
question by all parties. This makes oral proceedings necessary. As they unavoidably
commence some time after the incident in question, the law has to address the duties
of witnesses and the legal status of their memories during the meantime.
While the legitimacy of the duty to testify is hardly disputed in principle – everyone
has to contribute his share to maintaining a (just) legal order – its precise contours are
less clear. Before court, witnesses have to testify to the best of their knowledge.
However, if memories were erased beforehand, witnesses cannot but truthfully refer
to their memory blanks. We are all too aware of the notorious memory gaps that
strikingly often befall people as soon as they enter courtrooms (not all of them bona
fide). Since memory blanks can be beneficial for witnesses, they might be tempted to
bring them about, and other interested parties might offer incentives to do so. Already
today, witnesses might be able to render their testimony useless for legal purpose by
exposing memories to ordinary risks such as alcohol or repeated recall under distortive
influences (or seek the help of false memory implanters). At least intentional memory
26The same can be said about worries to “make the anguish go away”. Is it the anguish of the
victim that shall persist or not rather the anguish of noninvolved persons, as an empathic response
to the suffering.
27In special cases, procedural rules recognize painfulness of memories, e.g., in sex-related cases.
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distortions contradict the duty to testify truthfully. As self-induced witness amnesia
would seriously obstruct the administration of justice and cannot be tolerated by the
law, memory alterations that undermine accurate testimonies should be prohibited.
Insofar as current provisions do not capture self-induced memory loss, offenses such as
destruction of or tampering with evidence should be extended to encompass engrams in
the brain.28However, tampering with engrams is in many ways dissimilar to tampering
with physical objects. Whereas the latter can be confiscated and stored, persons can, in
view of the dynamic nature of memory, hardly be obliged to preserve unmodified
memories (or the initial perception). Some modifications are inevitable as long as
memories are recalled and reconsolidated. Thus the law should reconsider the scope of
witnesses’ duties of care towards their fragile memories in light of current research.
Memory blunting might be the most pressing issue. On the empirical side, the impact
of emotional blunting on factual recall has to be investigated. If emotional responses can
be numbed while facts are largely preserved, the main legal interest in memory –
gaining knowledge about the past – is not seriously threatened.29 If, by contrast, blunting
deteriorates factual recall, delicate balances have to be struck between societal interests
in preserving accurate memories and witnesses’ right to mental health. Roughly, we
suggest that persons not responsible for the event such as victims or bystander witnesses
cannot be expected by law to suffer intense and debilitating trauma. The short time
window for interventions during consolidation (a couple of hours) raises a host of
practical problems that need to be addressed (Cf. Kolber 2006, p. 1587).30 Eventually,
after witnesses have testified, the law does not stipulate further claims over their
memories.
Effects on Responsibility
Another objection pertains to the effects of memory alterations on moral responsi-
bility. The Council voices the concern that the idea of moral responsibility could
unravel because victims would not seek justice any longer: Instead of forgiving, they
would simply forget.31 From a legal perspective, this worry seems farfetched and
reverses the interests in question. Among the major aims for holding persons
responsible is redressing harms inflicted on victims. The victim’s main claim is
restoration of the status quo ante, i.e., to put him in a position as if the harming
28See Kolber (2006), p. 1589 for a US-specific argument to this end.
29On occasion, the law might have further interests in unmodified emotions (e.g., in assessing
damages), Kolber (2006), p. 1592.
30Perhaps immediate, taped interrogations to record at least a first unaltered testimony should be
developed. But even then some parties have a disadvantage as they cannot cross-examine the
witness. Also, in the immediate aftermath it is impossible to predict who will develop trauma, so
the interests to be balanced are unclear in the moment in which actions have to be taken.
Furthermore, it is often not evident whether memories will be of legal relevance; how long should
people wait?
31Ricoeur (2004) argues that forgiving can be facilitated through forgetting.
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action had never occurred (restitutio in integrum). Because history cannot be undone,
this claim often remains unfulfillable, and secondary (financial) remedies are
awarded instead. Easing negative mental consequences for victims would be the
closest approximation to full restoration. Mitigating psychological harm, if necessary
through memory alterations, is therefore a demand of justice, not its abandonment.32
The sinister consequences memory numbing may have on responsibility are
often illustrated by two powerful images: One is the soldier with subdued emotions,
blind and unresponsive to the horrors in which he participates, an epitome of
a soulless human killing machine. The other is borrowed from Shakespeare’s
Macbeth:
Cure her of that: Canst thou not minister to a mind diseas’d; Pluck from the memory
a rooted sorrow; Raze out the written troubles of the brain; And with some sweet oblivious
antidote Cleanse the stuff’d bosom of that perilous stuff / Which weighs upon the heart?33
Memory & Conscience
The idea of people washing away their feelings of guilt along with their recollec-
tions or of murderers with a clean conscience is highly troublesome. Accordingly it
is widely held that perpetrators of crimes should not, as Macbeth hoped for his wife,
numb their pangs of conscience through memory-blunting drugs (Parens 2010). On
a closer look, memory plays only an instrumental role in these cases. What is really
at stake is whether persons are sometimes obliged to experience feelings of guilt.
Moral intuitions suggest that a guilty mind should be a conscience-struck mind. But
is this also a legal duty? This intriguing question falls within the ambit of another,
firmly established human right: freedom of conscience, enshrined in every human
right treaty and among the core guarantees of the human rights system. Judicature
and scholarship consider the inner side, the so-called forum internum where
conscientious beliefs and emotions are formed, as protected unconditionally, i.e.,
intrusions are strictly prohibited. The central idea is that the conscience of the
individual must, in principle, remain outside of the reach of governments. Although
the precise contours of the right and its limits have yet to be defined,34 freedom of
conscience seems to imply that states do not have any legal claim over the
conscience of the individual and that regulations of substances cannot be grounded
in undesirable effects on conscience. The social interest in sustaining pangs of
conscience then appears insufficient to curb its freedom.
32Furthermore victims have moral claims against perpetrators, e.g., to explain their reasons for
actions. Memory erasure could thwart these obligations, which are often not enforceable by law
because defendants enjoy privileges against self-incrimination and can remain silent.
33Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act V, Scene 3.
34The best analysis is Hammer (2001).
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However, one should recall that the notion behind the absolute nature of the right
lies in the protection of the individual against persecution for deeply held moral
convictions and pressure to renounce one’s faith. The origins of the right date back
to confessional wars in medieval times. Neither in its historical genesis nor in legal
scholarship the possibility of intentionally silencing one’s “inner guiding voice” of
conscience has been thoroughly considered. It raises the deeper question whether
liberal states can require citizens to possess a minimum set of socially desirable
psychological traits. Can a legal duty to be a moral agent, potentially riddled by
a guilty conscience, be imposed on citizens; might it be legally enforced through
denial of access to conscience-numbing drugs or even involuntary enhancement of
moral dispositions? Perhaps. These issues run much deeper than freedom of
memory. Current interpretations of liberty of conscience prima facie speak against
a legal duty to be struck by one’s conscience.
Memories of Perpetrators
As a consequence, soldiers are not legally obliged to feel remorse and cannot, in
virtue of this fact, be stopped from altering their conscience, but military codes of
conduct could proscribe use of memory-impairing substances. In practice, however,
the military likely encourages numbing if it lives up to the promise of reducing the
high rates of personnel suffering from PTSD. We share worries of soldiers killing
with a clean conscience and – although we acknowledge the general weakness of
arguments based on human nature – cannot but agree that some valuable essence of
what it means to be human might be lost in those cases. However, we also sense
some hypocrisy in the contention that soldiers ought to bear painful trauma for what
others have commanded them to do.35
The most convincing case for an exception to the absolute protection of
conscience can be made with regard to culpable offenders. In an insightful anal-
ysis, Carter Snead shows that the various aims of criminal punishment in one way
or another presuppose that offenders and society remember fitly and truly.Memory
modifications may thwart these aims (Snead 2011). What follows from this? In
general, offenders do not have to contribute to the aims of the criminal justice
system. This point is particularly important with respect to rehabilitation, the
reduction of criminogenic psychological factors to reintegrate offenders upon
release, which is among the main penological aims. In many countries, offenders
are entitled to access to rehabilitative support but cannot be coerced into partici-
pation. States may provide incentives and rewards (e.g., reduced sentence, therapy
as a condition for parole), but offenders can ultimately refuse rehabilitative
attempts to remold their minds and serve their full sentence instead (and may
35Kolber (2006), p. 1621 draws the parallel between physical and emotional wounds. If treating the
former raises no worries, why the latter? We suspect because of an (implicit) intuition that soldiers
deserve mental torments, which is unconvincing as a general principle.
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remain in preventive custody subsequently).36 Whether coerced rehabilitation is
viewed favorably depends on one’s stance on the legitimatory grounds for pun-
ishment. The venerable issue may attract renewed attention if novel means for
rehabilitation prove effective. Perhaps states might deny access to substances that
subdue emotions conducive to rehabilitation such as guilt, remorse, or shame as
part of punishment. Nonetheless, we hasten to remind that offenders are entitled to
basic rights such as mental health, including treatment of painful mental conse-
quences which originate in their wrongful deeds. Thus borders between self-incurred
(and morally deserved) mental turmoil and pathological trauma might have to be
drawn. While working through and coming to terms with one’s deeds should be the
default position, in cases of severe PTSD symptoms, offenders’ right to mental health
seems to outweigh societal interests in their suffering and entitles them to therapeutic
memory alterations.
A Duty to Enhance
Finally, Vedder and Klaming have proposed employing memory enhancements for
the common good, e.g., to improve recollection of witnesses (Vedder and Klaming
2010). In their view, public interests in obtaining accurate testimony might out-
weigh freedom of memory of witnesses. Although for lack of reliable enhancers
such calls are premature at present, it is worth pondering whether states could
stipulate duties to enhance memory. Freedom of memory does not oppose voluntary
but protects against mandatory enhancements. As argued before, duties of wit-
nesses seem to end where (more than trivial) side effects begin. But even for
apparently side-effect-free memory enhancements like regular sleep (Thorley
2013). or repeated retrieval of the respective memory (Chan and Lapaglia 2011;
Pansky and Nemets 2012), a legal obligation might be considered an undue burden
to witnesses. Further details depend on particularities of each jurisdiction. Some do
not even require witnesses to “refresh” their memory, e.g., through consulting
records, while others explicitly ban memory-altering tools, including enhance-
ments.37 If lawmakers are tempted to amend current provisions, more than side
effects should be taken into account. Vedder and Klaming’s proposal is intriguing
because it prompts general considerations over the politics of memory.
Conclusion and Future Directions
For the most part of history, humankind’s knowledge of the past has relied on
orally transmitted accounts based onmemories, individual and collective.Memory
has been an extremely important capacity for cultural development, reflected in the
36Some countries have mandatory rehabilitation programs for drug users and sex offenders.
37Cf. } 136a German Code of Criminal Procedure.
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fact that duties to remember can be found in the writings of many major religions
(Margalit 2002). Forgetting has likewise been a tool for political power. Impera-
tives to erase names of disgraced persons can be found in the bible. A Roman
punishment consisted in damnatio memoriae, the “condemnation of the memory”
of a person. These were predecessors of notorious attempts to manipulate collec-
tive memory such as Stalinist retouching of historical photographs. Ricoeur points
to the Edicts of Nantes by Henry IV whose very first article proclaimed that “the
memory of all things that have taken place” during preceding wars “remains
extinguished and dormant as something that has not occurred” (Ricoeur 2004,
p. 454). Back then, amnesia was prescribed to secure peace. Today we can witness
converse tendencies such as granting amnesty for people who truthfully testify
before South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Committee. Both examples prove
the political dimension of memory.
Calls to employ enhancements for public interests should be viewed with
suspicion. They would, for the first time, expand the reach of governmental powers
over memory from external records directly into minds and brains. What if states
enhance only those memories supportive of their cause – might the past not be
alterable through partially enhancing recollection? What if other memories were
subdued or erased? How could misuse of these powers be effectively ruled out?
The inaccessible nature of one’s own and others’ memories has shielded them
from direct governmental access. Neuroscience might overcome these natural bar-
riers with potentially far-ranging implications for the way society deals with mem-
ories of individuals and with history at large. They need to be discussed not only by
ethicists but the general public and democratic institutions, in order to formulate
a framework for a politics of memory. On occasion, the memories of a single
individual have changed the course of history. This perspective might underscore
the importance of freedom of memory and motivate its acceptance as a fundamental
right. After all, as George Orwell urged, if governments acquire the means to alter the
way we perceive the past, they may well acquire those to alter the future.
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